The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 13
Issue 2 June

Article 3

May 1986

Determinants of Knowledge about Social Security: A Study of
Nonremarried Widows Caring for Children
Martha N. Ozawa
Washington University, St. Louis

William T. Alpert
University of Connecticut, Stamford Branch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Ozawa, Martha N. and Alpert, William T. (1986) "Determinants of Knowledge about Social Security: A
Study of Nonremarried Widows Caring for Children," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 13 :
Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol13/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY: A STUDY OF
NONREMARRIED WIDOWS CARING FOR CHILDREN
Martha N. Ozawa, Ph.D.
George Warren Brown School of Social Work
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
and
William T. Alpert, Ph.D.
Department of Economics
The University of Connecticut-Stamford Branch
Stamford, Connecticut 06903

ABSTRACT
Social security beneficiaries and the general public
alike are concerned about the financial solvency of the social
security program. But how much do they know about how the
system works?
This study analyzes the determinants of
knowledge about social security among nonremarried widows
having children under their care. It builds a research model
based on the economic theory of rational decision making.
Using ordinary least squares regression estimation techniques,
the level of knowledge about specific social security
provisions is regressed on family income, implicit tax rate,
number of children, human capital variables, and other
demographic and locational variables. The findings support
the economic theory applied to this study. Widows who gain
more by knowing social security provisions indeed know more
about them than those who gain less.

For months before Congress enacted the Social Security
Amendments of 1983 many Americans had been concerned
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about an impending financial collapse in social security.
Since the social security system is complex, they must have
been concerned about the program knowing very little about
exactly how the system works. Many politicians too must
have been in such a situation. Thus, an interesting question
can be raised: How much do people know about social
security?
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has recently
pursued this question. Using data from the 1978 Survey of
Survivor Families with Children, SSA conducted a study that
produced descriptive statistics on the level of knowledge that
nonremarried widows, remarried widows, and widowers have
about social security (Abbott, 1873).
It seems pertinent for policymakers to study how much
social security beneficiaries know about social security. For
one thing, since social security is an important source of
income for many surviving families, economists theorize that
many beneficiaries may base their economic actions on what
In addition, legislators pass laws
they know about it.
regarding social security, assuming that beneficiaries respond
to such new laws. Thus, knowledge about social security
potentially is an important factor influencing the daily lives
of social security beneficiaries. Yet, very little study has
been devoted to the whole question of how much social
security beneficiaries know about the workings of the social
security program (Abbott, 1983; Peter D. Hart Associates,
1979).
RELATED STUDIES
Earlier studies related-albeit indirectly-to the present
study look at the effect of knowledge on the behavior of
those receiving transfer payments. For example, a study by
Coe shows that a family receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) is more likely to apply for food
stamps than a family not receiving AFDC (Coe, 1977). His
findings imply that AFDC families acquire knowledge about
the food stamp program through their AFDC experience and,
using that knowledge, proceed to apply for food stamps. In a
study on characteristics of the elderly who contact a social
security office to apply for Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Ozawa (1980) finds that the elderly who have received
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social counseling services are more likely to contact a social
security office to inquire about SSI. This finding implies that
when the elderly receive social counseling services, they
acquire knowledge about SSI, which leads them to contact the
social security office. Further, it is a well-proven fact that
retirees limit the amount of earnings in order to escapte
reduction of benefits, implying that knowledge about social
security influences beneficiaries' behavior (Reno, 1976).
The present study extends SSA's recent research
effort. Using the same data file, it attempts to assess the
extent to which widows' characteristics have a bearing on
their level of knowledge about social security (Abbott,
1983).
Focusing on nonremarried widows, this study
investigates the determinants of social security knowledge in
a more systematic, detailed, and analytical fashion than the
SSA survey did. It includes numerous, additional variables
that capture more detailed information regarding family
income,
family backgrounds, widows' human capital,
demographic backgrounds, and location of residence.
The SSA study presented cross tabulations of knowledge
in relation to various independent variables taken one at a
time; the present study uses regression estimation techniques
instead. Applying these techniques, the study attempts to
measure the net effect of each independent variable in the
regression model.
Furthermore, this study develops
composite indices of knowledge covering several areas of
social security provisions and all areas combined. In contrast,
the SSA study deals with each questionnaire item
separately. The use of indices enables researchers to put
research questions in a somewhat broader perspective.
The major objective of this study, then, is to provide
more systematic information for answering the following
question: How much do nonremarried widows know about the
way the social security program works and what makes some
of them more knowledgeable about this than other widows?
Nonremarried widows are chosen as the focus of this study
because they depend heavily on social security as a source of
income and therefore may have more at stake in knowing
about it. 1
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FRAMEWORK
Traditional economic theory about rational decision
making is applied in building a model for this study. This
theory asserts that beneficiaries acquire knowledge about
social security-like any other economic good-in order to
maximize utility.
Three phenomena are involved in the
theory: income effects, price effects, and the effect of
opportunity costs of forgone benefits.
According to the
theory, individuals having a high, normal expected income
demand more of all goods, including knowledge about social
security. On the other hand, individuals who have to pay a
higher price for acquiring knowledge are less likely to invest
their resources for acquiring it than those who pay a lower
price. Finally, individuals who face greater opportunity costs
of forgone benefits because of ignorance have a greater
incentive to acquire knowledge than those facing less of such
costs (Stigler, 1961). We shall build a research model using
family income, the number of children, the implicit tax rate
on earnings, and human capital variables that reflect these
theoretical constructs.
Other demographic and locational
variables will also be included as controls.
On the basis of this theory, we can expect family
income to be positively related to widows' knowledge about
social security. We can disaggregate income into three parts
and thus consider three income variables: social security
benefits for the survivor family, the widow's own earnings,
and other family income, which includes children's earnings,
rent, dividends, and interest. It should be noted, however,
that the widow's wage rate is a more appropriate measure of
normal expected income than her actual earnings (which may
be influenced by the earnings test, hours worked, and other
transitory factors). Therefore, we will use the widow's wage
rate as a component of family income instead of her actual
earnings. But it is hard to predict which way the widow's
wage rate is related to her knowledge. Wages, unlike other
types of income, not only create income effects but also
price effects. That is, on the one hand, high-wage widows are
expected to acquire more knowledge than low-wage widows
because high wages mean more income; on the other hand,
high-wage widows have to pay a higher price for acquiring
knowledge because their time is more valuable than that of
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low-wage widows.
Thus, the question of how the widow's
wage rate affects her knowledge is empirical in nature.
The number of children potentially has both price
effects and the effect of opportunity costs of forgone
benefits on the knowledge level among widows. On the one
hand, widows caring for a large number of children value
their time at home more than their time spent elsewhere.
Thus time spent for acquiring knowledge about social security
is relatively costly for them. On the other hand, since such
women expect larger amounts of family benefits than do
widows with fewer children, they potentially forgo larger
benefits if they remain ignorant of the program.
Thus,
widows in this case have a greater stake in knowing about the
program.
One also needs to be aware of the effects of specific
social security provisions. When widows have more than 2
children, for instance, it is likely that their family will
receive maximum family benefits regardless of how much
they earn. 2 Conversely, if there is only one child, widows'
earnings potentially result in benefit reductions. Thus, it is
plausible that widows with more children know more about
the provision of maximum family benefits than widows with
fewer children. It is plausible as well that widows with fewer
children know more about the earnings test than those with
many children. At any rate, because the number of children
is expected to influence the knowledge level in many
directions, it is difficult to predict which way this variable is
related to a widow's knowledge about social security.
For the purposes of this study, children will be
considered in three age brackets: (a) the number of children
younger than age 18, (b) the number between 18 and 21, and
(c) the number older than 21.
Differentiating children
according to age brackets se ms important since social
security treats them differently.
The age of the youngest child is expected to make a
difference in the widow's knowledge about social security.
Widows whose youngest child is still of tender age may have
to spend more time on child care. This increases the price of
the widow's time at home in relation to time spent for other
purposes, including acquisition of knowledge about the
program. Thus, we expect the age of the youngest child to be
inversely related to the widow's knowledge leveL
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The opportunity costs of forgone benefits because of
ignorance are involved in the implicit tax rate that many
working widows are subjected to. In 1977 widows could earn
up to $3,000 without having their benefits reduced. If they
earned more than this amount, their benefits were cut at the
rate of $1 for each $2 of excess earnings in the same year.
Thus, not knowling about this specific provision would result
in a forgone opportunity to maximize their social security
benefits, reduce hours of work, or both. The higher the
implicit tax rate on earnings, the greater the forgone
opportunity costs of not knowing about the program.
Therefore, we expect widows subjected to higher implicit tax
rates to have a greater incentive to acquire knowledge about
the program than other widows.
Also, we infer from economic theory that widows with
more human capital are more efficient in acquiring
knowledge than those with less. By human capital, we mean,
for the purposes of this study, age, education, labor market
experience, and health. Widows with more human capital can
acquire a given amount of knowledge at a lower price (cost)
than those with less human capital. Thus we hypothesize that
human capital variables are positively related to program
knowledge.
For instance, better educated widows can
understand more readily what the publications on social
security mean to them, and thus pay a lower price for
acquiring knowledge than do less educated widows. This line
of reasoning applies also to the other human capital variables
mentioned above.
We shall consider these human capital
variables in this study, since human capital theoriest agree
that they constitute vital components of human capital
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1973; Mincer, 1974; Sorenson, 1975;
Kalacheck and Raines, 1976).
For the purposes of this study, labor market experience
among widows can be compartmentalized into three phases:
work experience before marriage to the deceased husband,
work experience during that marriage, and work experience
after the husband's death. Work experience is disaggregated
for two reasons: First, the knowledge level may be related to
the vantage point of work experience. Second, only earnings
after the husband's death potentially results in a reduction of
benefits that widows' families are nominally entitled to,
which in turn may be related to the knowledge levels of
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widows (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Sandall and Shapiro,
1978).
In addition to years of education, it seems relevant to
consider whether the widow was in school at the time of the
Being exposed to contemporary education might
survey.
heighten a widow's awareness about social security, other
things being equal. 4
Further, we hypothesize that being healthy is directly
related to the level of knowledge. It is known that healthy
people are more productive in the labor market. Given this
fact, we expect healthy widows to acquire knowledge at a
lower cost than unhealthy ones. Similar arguments can be
made about age, which we hypothesize is inversely related to
knowledge.
We have so far discussed a conceptual framework built
around the economic theory of rational decision making.
However, other variables may affect the level of knowledge
about social security. For example, length of time since the
husband's death may be positively related to the level of
knowledge. The longer the survivor's family receives social
security benefits, the longer the widow's exposure to the
program and thus the more knowledge about it. Location of
residence may also have some bearing on the knowledge
Rural living, compared with urban, may facilitate
level.
development of closer relationships and therefore more
communication among widows and between widows and other
residents, resulting in widows' greater knowledge about social
Similarly, living in different regions may have
security.
different effects on the level of knowledge, although it is
hard to predict a priori which region is most positively
related to the level of knowledge. Race, too, may have some
influence; varying lifestyles and value systems of white and
nonwhite families may have different effects on knowledge
about social security. Also, a variable that captures varying
marital status of the currently nonremarried widows will be
considered as a control. There may be a difference in the
level of knowledge between widows who stayed nonremarried
since their husband's death and widows who remarried and
then became nonremarried once again due to divorce or
separation from their new husband.
Independent and control variables discussed here are
presented with their definitions in Appendix 1.
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METHODOLOGY

Variables Further Defined
In the 1978 survey, SSA asked respondents 10 specific
questions regarding the Survisors Insurance component of the
social security program. The questions fall into four areas:
(a) the provisions of children's benefits (4 items); (b) the
provision of widows' benefits (3 items); (c) the maximum
family benefit rule (1 item); and (d) the provision of earnings
test (2 items). The questions and their correct answers are
shown in Appendix 2.
For the purpose of this study, the proportion of correct
answers in each area was obtained. In this way, we developed
4 dependent variables, covering the four specific areas of
knowledge. We developed an additional dependent variable,
covering all questions taken as a whole-that is, the
proportion of correct answers involving all 10 questions. In
contrast, SSA dealt with each question separately (Abbott,
1983).
The implicit tax rate and the widow's wage rate require
Under social security, widows who
further explanation.
earned less then $3,000 in 1977 could keep their benefits
without reduction. Therefore, up to this point, the implicit
tax rate was zero. When earnings exceeded $3,000, benefits
were reduced at the rate of $1 for each $2 of excess earnings,
resulting in an implicit tax rate of 50 percent. But the
implicit tax rate became zero once again when earnings over
$3,000 reached twice the amount of the benefit, so that no
benefits were received. For the purposes of this study,
or 0.5 was assigned to widows,
therefore, a tax rate of zero
5
depending on their earnings.
Wage rates were expressed as hourly wages. To those
widows who did not work in 1978, the value of zero was
assigned. Of all widows under study, 40 percent did not
work. All other independent variables are straightforward.
Source of Data
As noted, this study used data from the 1978 Survey of
Survivor Families with Children, collected by SSA (Hastings
and Springer, 1980). This survey updated a previous SSA
survey (Palmore, Stanley, and Cormier, (1966). The 1978
survey included families headed by nonremarried widows, and
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for the first time, those headed by remarried widows and
those headed by nonremarried or remarried widowers as
well. All families had at least one child age 18 or younger
and were receiving survivors' benefits at the time of the
survey. The survey data were merged with the social security
program data to produce a sample of 5,752 widows and
widowers. Income data apply to 1977; non-income data to
1978.6
The present study selected widows who were not
married at the time of the survey.
Some, however, had
remarried after their husband's death and later were divorced
or separated from their new husband.
After excluding
persons for whom data were missing, the sample data size for
the present study became 3,438.
Statistical Method
In order to measure the strength of each independent
variable's effect in determining the dependent variables,
controlling for the effects of other variables, the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression estimation technique was
used. 7 The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
was used for computer programming.
FINDINGS
Level of Knowledge
The mean proportions of correct answers and their
standard deviations covering the various areas of questions
are shown in Table 1.
All questions taken together, widows seem to have a
relatively high level of knowledge about social security. On
the average, they answered correctly 62 percent of the
questions. Among the areas investigated, these widows seem
to have a particularly high level of knowledge on how
children's benefits are provided. In this area, the average
proportion of correct answers is 82 percent. However, in
other areas their average level of knowledge appears
drastically lower: 50 percent in questions dealing with how
widows' benefits are provided; 48 percent in questions
involving the earnings test, and 42 percent in the question
involving the maximum family benefit rule. In general, these
findings are consistent with those in the SSA study. Readers
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TABLE 1
Mean Proportions and Standard Deviations
of Correct Answers
Mean
Proportion

s.d.

Questions regarding
children's benefits

0.82

0.22

Questions regarding
widows'benefits

0.50

0.25

Questions regarding
maximum benefits

0.42

0.49

Questions regarding
the earnings test

0.48

0.28

All questions combined

0.62

0.18
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interested in finding the level of knowledge about each
specific question should consult that study (Abbott, 1983).
Regression Results
Table 2 presents the results from five separate OLS
regressions. Each column shows coefficients of independent
and control variables in determining the proportion of correct
answers to quesitons: first, children's benefits; second,
widow's benefits; third, the maximum family benefit rule;
fourth, the earnings test; and fifth, all questions taken
together.
Income-related Variables: Generally, income-related
variables appear to have strong influence on widows'
knowledge about social security. First, the amount of social
security benefits (SS$FAM) is positively, and statistically
significantly, related to knowledge in all areas of concern.
The directions of the coefficients are all as expected. Highbenefit recipients seem to know particularly well how the
earnings test works.
All questions considered together,
widows with high levels of benefits tend to know more about
social security.
Other income (OTHINC) is also related to the widows'
level of knowledge.
In all areas except that concerning
children's benefits, the relationships between other income
and the dependent variables are statistically significant. The
directions of relationship are positive, as expected, in all
areas. Again, as in the case of SS$FAM, OTHINC is strongly
related to overall knowledge about social security. Widows
who command a large amount of OTHINC know more about
social security than others do.
However, the wage rate (WAGE) is not related to
knowledge about social security, although the directions of
relationship are as predicted in all areas. This may indeed
show that this variable exerts on the dependent variables both
the income effect and the price effect, which offset each
other, with the former slightly outweighing the latter. That
is, the wage rate measures not only a widow's own normal
income but also the value of her time. Thus, on the one hand,
high-wage widows demand more knowledge because they have
more income; on the other hand, they use less time for
acquiring program knowledge because their time is expensive.
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Implicit Tax Rate (TAX): We hypothesized that widows
subjected to the earnings test-that is, those whose benefits
were reduced because of excess earnings-would have a
higher stake in knowing how social security works because
they would face greater forgone opportunity costs of not
knowing social security provisions. When all questions are
considered,
the coefficient of TAX is positive and
statistically significant, confirming our hypothesis. However,
when we focus on specific areas, statistical significance is
obtained in only one area, although all coefficients are
positive as expected.
The implicit tax rate exerts a
significant effect on widows' knowledge about how their own
benefits are provided but not about other aspects of social
security.
Why does TAX make difference in knowledge only in
this particular area? We can explain the situation as follows:
Under social security, widows' earnings in excess of the
exempted amount result in a reduction in their own benefits
but not in their children's benefits. Thus, widows subjected to
the earnings test were more aware of rules and regulations
regarding their own benefits than about other aspects of
social security. On the other hand, it is somewhat puzzling
that the implicit tax rate is not related to their knowledge
about the earnings test itself.
We expected that widows
subjected to the earnings test would know more about it.
Number of Children: Variables regarding the number of
children appear to be related to knowledge about social
security in a complex way. First, the number of children
under age 18 (NUMLT18) is significantly and negatively
related to widows' knowledge about how widows' benefits are
provided and how the earnings test works. On the other hand,
NUMLT18 is related to widows' knowledge in other areas in
the opposite direction, albeit without statistical significance.
The number of children age 18 through 21 (NUMLTI821)
is related to widows' knowledge in all 4 specific areas in the
same directions as those observed when the dependent
variables were regressed on NUMLT18.
But the level of
statistical significance differs.
The number of children age 22 and over (NUME22)
seems to have nothing to do with widows' knowledge about
social security. Statistical significance is not achieved in any
of the areas of knowledge, and the coefficients have differing
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signs.
We will henceforth ignore this variable in our
discussion.
What can we make of the complex relationship between
the number of children and widows' knowledge about social
security? We explain the situation in two ways: first, by
examining the significance level of coefficients; second, by
looking at the pattern of relationship between independent
and dependent variables in specific areas of concern, ignoring
statistical significance.
Earlier, we hypothesized that both the price effect and
the effect of forgone benefits are involved in the number of
children and that these effects counteract each other. The
preponderance
of
statistically
significant,
negative
coefficients involving NUMLT18 seems to indicate that in
this variable the price effect outweights the effect of
forgone opportunity costs. That is, widows with many young
children (those in the age bracket of one to 18) find it more
valuable to spend their time in caring for the children than in
acquiring knowledge about social security, even though more
children mean more benefits.
On the other hand, the
preponderance
of
statistically
significant,
positive
coefficients involving NUM1821 seems to indicate that the
reverse is true for this age bracket. That is, widows with
several children in this age bracket no longer need to spend as
much time and energy caring for them as might be needed to
care for young children, and therefore are willing or able to
invest their time in acquiring knowledge, because more
children mean more benefits.
Next, we attempt to explain the pattern of relationship
between the number of children and the dependent variables
in specific areas of concern. By observing how NUMLT18 and
NUM1821 are related to the four specific areas of knowledge,
ignoring the coefficients' statistical significance, we can
offer the following explanation. First, we observe a negative
relationship between the number of children and widows'
knowledge about the earnings test. In a family with only a
few children-for example, one chile-the widow's earnings
potentially result in a reduction in family benefits. Thus,
such families may have a high opportunity cost of ignorance.
On the other hand, in a family with many children, the
widow's earnings would not result in a reduction in family
benefits.
The family simply continues to receive the
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maximum family benefit. Thus, we can surmise that widows
with fewer children would have more at stake in knowing how
the earnings test works, and therefore would try to be more
knowledgeable about it.
On the other hand, the number of children would exert a
positive effect on widows' knowledge about the maximum
family benefit rule.
Families with a larger number of
children (more than two) would receive only the maximum
family benefit, which is less than the sum of benefits for all
eligible family members. Thus, we can expect that widows
with many children would be exposed to this provision and
therefore would have a greater opportunity and interest in
knowing about it. This is exactly what the coefficients of
NUMLT18 and NUM1821 seem to indicate.
An inverse relationship is observed between the number
of children and widows' knowledge about how widows' benefits
are provided.
All three questions used to develop a
knowledge index in this area deal with the relationship
between children's benefits and widows' benefits. Under the
law, widows are entitled to their benefits only when they
have children in their care.
When children's benefits
terminate, widows' benefits also terminate.
Widows can
resume receiving benefits in their own right as aged widows
when they reach 60. Thus, we can surmise that a larger
number of children ensures greater stability of benefits for
widows.
Conversely, a smaller number of children would
heighten concern about widows' benefits being terminated
some day, resulting in widows' greater stake in understanding
the provisions of widows' benefits. Perhaps, this is why the
coefficients of these variables are negative. That is, the
smaller the number of children in either age bracket, the
greater the level of the widow's knowledge about the
provisions of widows' benefits: here again the potential
opportunity costs of ignorance are high.
On the other hand, the direction of relationship between
the number of children and widows' knowledge about
children's benefits is positive. All four questions in this area
deal strictly with children's benefits. Thus, we can surmise
that a larger number of children translate into a widow's not
only wanting to understand the provisions but also being more
extensively exposed to the workings of social security. More
children mean more benefits, subject to the maximum family
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benefit ceiling; frequent dealings with the Social Security
Administration lower the price of acquiring program
knowledge.
The age of the youngest child (AGEYG77) was included
in the regression to measure the price of widows' time. This
variable appears to have no bearing on widows' knowledge
level about social security. Statistical significance is not
achieved in any area.
Human Capital Variables: First, with regard to work
experience, we observe that all of the signs of the
coefficients of work experience during marriage (MAREX)
and after the husbands death (POSTEX) are positive as
expected.
Statistical significance is achieved only
sporadically, however.
Note also that the signs of the
coefficients
of
work
experience
before
marriage
(PREMAREX) differ depending on the areas of knowledge
about social security, with no statistical significance in any
area. We might tentatively interpret as follows: The number
of years of work experience before marriage to the deceased
husband has little to do with widows' extent of knowledge
about social security. However, there is some indication that
the number of years of work, either during the marriage or
after the husband's death, is positively related to the
knowledge level among widows.
There is no question that education (EDUCATN) is a
strong determinant of knowledge about social security.
Observe the strong relationship between the number of years
of schooling and the knowledge level in all areas, except the
provision of widows' benefits. As hypothesized, the more
educated widows are,the greater their knowledge in all areas
except that dealing with widows' benefits. These findings
indicate that more educated widows are more productive in
acquiring knowledge, given the same price and opportunity
costs, than less educated widows. This certainly is consistent
with economic theory.
On the other hand, the variable capturing current school
attendance (INSCHOOL) is not a significant determinant of
knowledge. However, all signs of the coefficients for this
variable are as expected except in the regression involving
theh provisions of children's benefits. The relatively weak
effect of this variable may stem from the fact that it not
only measures a widow's human capital but also captures the
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price of acquiring knowledge. Widows attending school should
feel that it is more costly to spend their time acquiring
knowledge about social security than those not in school.
Perhaps because of these two opposing forces at work in the
same variable, statistical significance is not attained in any
area.
Health status (HEALTH) is another variable measuring
widows' human capital. None of its coefficients, however, is
statistically significant, indicating that health status is not
related to the level of knowledge about social security. The
widow's age (AGE) as a human capital variable is not a
significant determinant of knowledge about social security,
either.
Control Variables: The control variables that emerge as
consistently strong determinants of knowledge about social
security are race (WHITE) and duration of time since the
death of the husband (DURATN). Being white is positively
related to the knowledge level in all aspects of social
security. Statistical significance is achieved in all areas
except the one dealing with the maximum family benefit
rule.
In general, we can say that white widows know
significantly more about social security than nonwhite
widows.
Duration of time since the husband's death is another
strong determinant of knowledge about social security.
Statistical significance is achieved in all areas except the one
involving the maximum family benefit rule, and the directions
of the coefficients are as expected in all areas. Widows who
have spent more years since their husband's death indeed
know more about how social security works than do widows
who have spent fewer years.
Another control variable of interest is urban vs. rural
residence (URBAN). Notice that there are two statistically
significant coeffecients with negative signs. This indicates
that widows living in the rural areas know more about social
security than do widows living in urban areas. However, two
coefficients are not significant, and indeed have positive
signs. With these two sets of internal forces working against
each other, the coefficient for all of the questions taken
together (see column 5) is negative and statistically
significant at the .05 level. Thus, we tentatively conclude
that rural widows appear to know more about certain aspects
of social security than do urban widows.
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Region seems to make a difference in the knowledge
level. We observe that, compared with widows in the South,
those in the West (RD4) are less knowledgeable about social
The level of Western widows' knowledge is
security.
significantly lower in two specific areas and also when all
questions are considered as a whole. In one area only, RD4 is
positively related to the knowledge level but without
statistical significance.
Comparing widows in Northeastern (RDI) and North
Central (RD2) with Southern widows, we observe that the
former

are

significantly

more knowledgeable

about the

maximum family benefit rule than the latter. In all other
areas, however, no statistical significance is achieved and the
coefficients of these variables are negative. Thus, region of
residence makes some difference in widows' knowledge,
although it is difficult to explain why.
Whether widows were separated or divorced (CURSD) at
the time of survey seems to have a statistically significant
difference in knowledge about one aspect of social securitythe earnings test. Those who were either separated or
divorced at the time of the survey knew significantly less
about how the earnings test works. It is hard to explain why,
however.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In general, nonremarried widows have a surprisingly
high level of knowledge about social security. Their average
proportion of correct answers is 62 percent. However, their
level of knowledge varies depending on the specific area of
knowledge.
They tend to know the provisions regarding
benefits for surviving children particularly well. They know
least about the maximum family benefit rule.
Findings from this study validate the economic theory
of rational decision making. Major findings in support of this
theory are summarized below:
1. High-income widows demand and therefore acquire
more knowledge about social security-like any other normal
good-than low-income widows.
2. Widows who pay a higher price for acquiring
knowledge acquire less knowledge about social security than
those who pay a lower price. For example, widows who have
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to take care of many children of minor age are less
knowledgeable about the program than their counterparts
even though more children mean larger family benefits,
subject to the family maximum benefit rule.
3. Widows facing greater forgone opportunity costs of
not knowing specific provisions indeed know more about them
than widows not facing such a predicament. For instance,
widows with a smaller number of children need to be more
aware of possible cuts in family benefits because of widows'
earnings than widows with more children. Widows in such a
predicament indeed know more about specific provisions of
the earnings test. Conversely, widows with a larger number
of children know more about the maximum family benefit
rule than those with fewer children, because the former are
more likely to be affected by this rule than the latter. All
this indicates that widows facing certain issues indeed know
about social security provisions specifically related to such
issues.
4. Widows with greater human capital know more about
social security provisions because they can acquire a given
amount of knowledge for a lower price than those with less
human capital. For instance, women who are more educated
are more efficient in acquiring knowledge about social
security and therefore know more aobut the program than the
less educated.
Furthermore, directions of coefficients
regarding work experience and health status (though
statistical significance is rarely achieved), seem to further
support the argument that human capital positively affects
the level of knowledge about social security.
In addition to the findings specifically related to the
economic model developed in this study, two control variables
stand out as important determinants of knowledge: race and
length of time since the husband's death. The finding about
race indicates that white widows know more about the
program than nonwhite widows, although the reason remains
to be discovered.
The finding about the effect of time
elapsed since the husband's death indicates that widows get
more experienced as time passes in understanding social
more
result become
and as a
security provisions
knowledgeable about them than recent widows.
None of the findings in this study contradict those of
the SSA study. However, our findings do indeed extend and

229

clarify the SSA findings about beneficiaries' knowledge of
how social security works; they also present an enlightened
view of why some beneficiaries know more than others. This
study provides more precise information on the extent to
which independent variables determine nonremarried widows'
knowledge level regarding social security. For instance, the
SSA study reports that length of time since the husbands
death does not affect overall social security knowledge,
although it does affect knowledge about some specific
Our study, by using regression
quesitons (Abbott, 1983).
estimation techniques, succeeds in capturing the net effect of
this variable-which emerges as a strong determinant of
knowledge, not only in specific areas but in all areas
The same statement can be made about the
combined.
finding in regard to the relationship between the number of
children and the knowledge level; the use of regression
techniques reveal the relationship more clearly than does the
SSA crosstab approach.
Although our study is limited to nonremarried widows
caring for children, the findings should be important for
policy makers because social security is a major source of
income for this groups of survivor families and because what
they know-or don't know-about it affects their daily lives.
FOOTNOTES
1.

2.

For families of nonremarried widows, social security
benefits in 1977 constituted 45 percent of their total
money income.
This compared with 22 percent for
remarried widows' families, 15 percent for nonremarried
widowers' families, and 11 percent for remarried
widowers' families. The data source is the same as for
the present study.
Under social security, each survivor is nominally entitled
to benefits equivalent to 75 percent of the Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA, the basic benefit for the insured
worker if the worker retires at age 65 or is disabled).
However, when there are more than two survivors, the
surviving family faces the maximum family benefit
rule. Under this rule, the sum of all survivors' benefits in
the family may not be more than 1.5 to 1.88 times the
PIA, depending on the deceased worker's prior earnings
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3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

level.
Therefore, when there are more than two
surviving children, the widow's earnings do not affect the
amount of social security benefits that her family
receives.
In 1978 when the survey was taken, children under age 18
could receive benefits with no restriction.
Those
between 18 and 21 could receive benefits only if they
were full-time students. Those older than 21 could not
receive benefits unless they were disabled and the
diability started before they reached age 22.
Their
benefits terminate upon marriage regardless of their age.
Of all nonremarried widows under study, 3 percent were
attending school at the time of the survey.
Recall, however, that at the time of the survey widows
were asked about the exempt amount effective as of
1978.
Therefore, the right answer to the question
regarding the earnings test was $3,240; but the exempt
amount of $3,000, which was effective in 1977, was used
by the author to assess whether these widows were
subjected to the earnings test in 1977.
The sampling frame consisted of an area probability
design conducted in three stages. First, the 99 primary
sampling units in SSA's contractor's national design.
Next, the choice of ZIP codes within the primary
sampling units was made with probability proportional to
size. Finally, cases within the specified sampling units
were selected from a social security list of eligible
cases. In order for the sample to represent properly
across the nation the universe of survivor families with
children, the sample was weighted to adjust for
nonresponse and for universe cell size. Thus, the sample
used in the survey represented a universe of 910,000
survivor families with children on social security.
Among them were 605,000 families of currently
nonremarried widows; 183,000 families of currently
52,000 families of currently
widows;
remarried
nonremarried widowers; and 70,000 families of currently
remarried widowers.
are
Logistic
regression
estimation
techniques
particularly appropriate to use when the dependent
variable takes the form of proportion, as was the case in
this study. We used both statistical procedures (logistic

and OLS regression techniques) and obtained almost
identical results. Since OLS regression results are more
comprehensible than logistic regression results, we
report the former in this paper.
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APPENDIX 1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
USED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Independent Variables
Income Variables
SS$FAM

Annual social security benefits for the
surviving family.

OTHINC

Income other than social security
benefits and the widow's own earnings.

WAGE

The widow's hourly wage rate. If the
widow did not work at the time of
survey, the value of zero is assigned.

Variables Capturing the Price Effect and the Effect of
Forgone Opportunity Costs
TAX

Implicit tax rate resulting from being
subjected to the earnings test: 0.5, if
subjected; zero, otherwise.

NUMLT18

Number of children age under 18.
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NUM1821

Number of children age 18 through 21.

NUMGE22

Number of children age 22 or older.

AGEYG77

Age of the youngest child in 1977.

Human Capital Variables
PREMAREX Number of years of work experience
before marriage to the the deceased
husband.
MAREX

Number of years of work experience
during
marriage
to the deceased
husband.

POSTEX

Number of years of work experience
after the death of husband.

EDUCATN

Number of years of schooling

INSCHOOL

School attendance
survey:
One,
if
otherwise.

HEALTH

Having health problems: One, if widow
assessed her health as poor; zero,
otherwise.

AGE

The widow's age in 1978.

at
in

the time of
school; zero

Control Variables
WHITE

Race: One, if white; zeor, otherwise.

DURATN

Number of years elapsed since the
death of husband.

URBAN

Urban vs. rural residence: One, if the
widow lived in an urban area: zero,
otherwise.
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RDI

Region of residence: One, if the widow
lived in the Northeastern region; zero,
otherwise.

RD2

Region of residence: One, if the widow
lived in the North Central region; zero,
otherwise.

RD4

Region of residence: One, if the widow
lived in the Western region; zero,
otherwise

CURSD

Current marital status: One, if divorced
or separated at the time of survey;
zero, otherwise.

Note that South is dropped from the regression.

This

means that all other regions are compared with South.
APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONS USED TO DEVELOP
THE SOCIAL SECURITY INDEX
(correct answers in parentheses)
Because
coverage,
following
no, or not

of (NAME OF DECEASED)'s Social Security
your family now gets benefits. For each of the
questions about these benefits, please answer yes,
sure.

Regarding benefits for children
1.

If that child is no longer enrolled in school, would that
child's benefits continue past the 18th birthday? (No)

2.

When the youngest child receiving benefits reaches age
18, could the widow still receive mother's benefits? (No)

3.

If something happened to (one of your children/your
child) while still young, and this child became disabled
and couldn't work, could this child keep getting Social
Security as an adult? (Yes)
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4.

If a child marries before age 20, would his/her benefits
continue? (No)

Regarding benefits for widows
1.

If a widow herself remarried while her children were still
young, could eligibility for her own benefits as a mother
continue? (No)

2.

If a widow were to remarry, would her children's benefits
continue? (Yes)

3.

A widow can also receive benefits when she reaches a
certain age, even if she has no young children. At what
age do you think you can first receive these aged widow
benefits? (60)

Regardng the maximum family benefit rule
1.

Is there a maximum amount Social Security will pay to a
family, no matter how many family members there are?
(Yes)

Regarding the earnings test
1.

Can the benefits that a widow receives ever be affected
by the money she receives from work? (Yes)

2.

What is the maximum yearly amount a person can earn
and still not affect their benefits? ($3,240 in 1978.
Note: For the purpose of this study, a margin of error up
to 5 percent on either side of $3,240 is allowed. Thus
amounts ranging from $3,078 to $3,402 are considered to
be correct responses.)
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